| 巻号 | 年月次 | タイトル | 著者 |
| 398 | 1983.3 | Generalizations of the Censored and Truncated Least Absolute Deviations Estimators | James L. Powell |
| 399 | 1983.2 | Behavior under Uncertainty and Its Implications for Policy | Kenneth J. Arrow |
| 400 | 1983.3 | Third-Order Efficiency of the Extended Maximum Likelihood Estimators in a Simultaneous Equation System | Kei Takeuchi, Kimio Morimune |
| 401 | 1983.3 | Short-Run Analysis of Fiscal Polecy in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model | Kenneth Judd |
| 402 | 1983.3 | Estimation of Failure Rate from a Complete Record of Failures and a Partial Record of Non-Failures | Kazuyuki Suzuki |
| 403 | 1982 | Applications of Semi-Regenerative Theory of Computations of Stationary Distributions of Markov Chains | W. K. Grassmann, Michael I. Taksar |
| 404 | 1983.5 | On the Optimality of Individual Behavior in First Come Last Served Queues with Preemption and Balking | Rafael Hassin |
| 405 | 1983.5 | Entry with Exit: An Extensive Form Treatment of Predation with Financial Constraints | Jean-Pierre Benoît |
| 406 | 1983.6 | Search among Queues | Amihai Glazer, Refael Hassin |
| 407 | 1982.12 | The Space of Polynomials in Measures Is Internal | Joshua Reichers, Yair Tauman |
| 408 | 1983.6 | Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect | Xavier Freixas, Roger Guesnerie, Jean Tirole |
| 409 | 1983.7 | A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs | Eric Maskin, Jean Tirole |
| 410 | 1983.7 | Approximate Measures of the Social Welfare Benefits of Labor Projects | Peter Hammond |
| 411 | 1983.7 | Transversality Conditions for Some Infinite Horizon Discrete Time Optimization Problems | Ivar Ekeland, José Alexandre Scheinkman |
| 412 | 1983.7 | Asymptotic Efficiency of the Partial Likelihood Estimator in the Proportional Hazard Model | Aaron K. Han |
| 413 | 1983.7 | A Monte Carlo Comparison of Estimators for Censored Regression Models | Harry J. Paarsch |
| 414 | 1983.7 | Instrumental-Variable Estimation of an Error-Components Model | Takeshi Amemiya, Thomas E. Macurdy |
| 415 | 1983.9 | An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value | Robert J. Aumann |
| 416 | 1983.8 | Diffusion Approximation in Arrow's Model of Exhaustable Resouces | Darrell Duffie, Michael Taskar |
| 417 | 1983.9 | The Shapley Value in the Non Differentiable Case | Jean Francois Mertens |
| 418 | 1983.9 | The Minimax Theorem for U.S C.-L.S.C. Payoff Functions | Jean Francois Mertens |
| 419 | 1983.9 | Altruistic Growth Economies, I. Existence of Bequest Equilibria, II. Properties of Bequest Equilibria | Debraj Ray, Douglas Bernheim |
| 420 | 1983.9 | On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium | William Novshek |
| 421 | 1983.9 | Equilibrium Turnpike Theory with Constant Returns to Scale and Possibly Heterogeneous Discount Factors | Jeffrey L. Colles |
| 422 | 1983.6 | Components of Variance in Manova | T. W. Anderson |
| 423 | 1983.9 | Prices for Homogeneous Cost Functions | Leonard J. Mirman, Abraham Neyman |
| 424 | 1983.10 | On the Duration of Agreements | Milton Harris, Bengt Holmstrom |
| 425 | 1983.10 | A Sequential Signalling Model of Convertible Debt Call Policy | Milton Harris, Arthur Raviv |
| 426 | 1983.10 | On the Marginal Cost of Government Spending | David Starrett |
| 427 | 1983.10 | Self-Agreed Cartel Rules | Kevin Roberts |
| 428 | 1983.10 | Dynamic Models of Oligopoly | Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole |
| 429 | 1983.10 | A Theory of Exit in Oligopoly | Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole |
| 430 | 1983.11 | Consumer Information in Markets with Random Product Quality: The Case of Queues and Balking | Rafael Hassin |
| 431 | 1983.10 | Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions | Robert Wilson |
| 432 | 1983.10 | Efficient Trading | Robert Wilson |
| 433 | 1983.10 | The Economic Theory of Individual Behavior Toward Risk: Theory, Evidence and New Directions | Mark J. Machina |
| 434 | 1983.11 | Reputations in Games and Markets | Bobert Wilson |
| 435 | 1983.11 | Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies | Peter J. Hammond |
| 436 | | The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems | William P. Rogerson |
| 437 | | Maximum Rank Correlation Estimator and Generalized Median Estimator in Censored Regression and Survival Models | Aaron K. Han |
| 438 | 1984.1 | On Endogenous Competitive Business Cycles | Jean-Michel Grandmont |
| 439 | 1984.1 | A Complete Characterization of Arma Solutions to Linear Rational Expectations Models | George Evans, Seppo Honkapohja |
| 440 | 1984.1 | Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations: A Synthesis | Jean Tirole |
| 441 | 1984.3 | Two Equivalence Theorems for the 'Finite Coalition Core' of a Continuum Economy | Peter J. Hammond |
| 442 | 1984.3 | Managerial Incentives and Non-Wage Benefits | William P. Rogerson |
| 443 | 1984.3 | A Survey of Agency Models of Organizations | Daniel Levinthal |
| 444 | 1984.4 | Two Papers On Sequential Bargaining, Paper I: Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms, Paper II: Bargaining with Incomplete Information an Infinite-Horizon Model with Continuous Uncertainty | Peter C. Cramton |
| 445 | 1984.4 | Borrowing Constraints and Aggregate Economic Activity | Jose A. Scheinkman, Laurence Weiss |
| 446 | 1984.4 | Periodic and Aperiodic Behavior in Discrete Onedimensional Dynamic Systems | Jean-Michel Grandmont |
| 447 | 1984.4 | Contractural Paradigms Rational Expectations and Seniority Rules in the Theory of Long-Term Labor Contracts | James Anton |
| 448 | 1984.9 | The Maximum Rank Correlation Estimator in Classical, Censored and Discrete Regression Models | Aaron K. Han |
| 449 | 1984.9 | Consequentialist Social Norms for Public Decisions | Peter J. Hammond |
| 450 | 1984.10 | On Asymmetric Information, Unemployment and Inflexible Wages | Mordecai Kurz |
| 451 | 1984.10 | The Economics of Agency | Kenneth J. Arrow |
| 452 | 1984.11 | On Equilibria of Bid-Ask Markets | Robert Wilson |
| 453 | 1984.11 | Multidimensional Signalling | Martine Quinzii, Jean-Charles Rochet |
| 454 | 1984.12 | Inequality, Malnutrition and Unemployment: A Critique of the Competitive Market Mechanism | Partha Dasgupta, Debraj Ray |
| 455 | 1984.12 | Procurement, Cost Overruns and Severance: A Study in Commitment and Renegotiation | Jean Tirole |
| 456 | 1985.2 | Multiparty Equilibria under Proportional Representation | Joseph Greenberg, Shlomo Weber |
| 457 | 1985.3 | Inequality and Capital Taxation | Joseph E. Stiglitz |
| 458 | 1985.3 | Lump-Sum Taxes and Transfers: Public Debt in the Overlapping-Generations Model | Yves Balasko, Karl Shell |
| 459 | 1985.4 | Project Evaluation by Potential Tax Reform | Peter J. Hammond |
| 460 | 1985.9 | Competitivity and the Number of Firms in a Market: Are Duopolies More Competitive Than Atomistic Markets? | J.E. Stiglitz |
| 461 | 1985.4 | Tiebout Equilibrium under Restricted Preferences Domain | Joseph Greenberg, Shlomo Weber |
| 462 | 1985.4 | On the Existence of Markov-Consistent Plans under Production Uncertainty | B. Douglas Bernheim, Debraj Ray |
| 463 | 1985.4 | Free Entry and Stability in a Cournot Model | Gabrielle Demange |
| 464 | 1984.9 | Instability in the Implementation of Walrasian Allocations | J.S. Jordan |
| 465 | 1985.5 | Technical Information, Returns to Scale, and the Existence of Competitive Equilibrium | Kenneth J. Arrow |
| 466 | 1985.5 | Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives | Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom |
| 467 | 1985.6 | Markov Perfect Equilibria in Altruistic Growth Economies with Production Uncertainty | B. Douglas Bernheim, Debraj Ray |
| 468 | 1985.6 | Foundation of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture | Faruk Gul, Hugo Sonnenschein, Robert Wilson |
| 469 | 1985.6 | Consistent Voting Rules for Competitive Local Public Goods Economies | Joseph Greenberg, Benyamin Shitovitz |
| 470 | 1985.7 | Nonpaternalistic Intergenerational Altruism | Debraj Ray |
| 471 | 1985.8 | Dynamic Allocation with Consistent Intergenerational Benevolence | Peter A. Streufert |
| 472 | 1986.3 | Consequentialism, Ellsberg's Paradox and Expected Evaluation | Peter J. Hammond |
| 473 | 1985.8 | The Normative Economics of Government Intervention in Production | B. Caillaud, R. Guesnerie, P. Ray, J. Tirole |
| 474 | 1985.8 | Game- Theoretic Analyses of Trading Processes | Robert Wilson |
| 475 | 1985.12 | Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames | Dilip Abreu |
| 476 | 1985.11 | The Algebra of Arma Processes and the Structure of Arma, Solutions to a General Linear Model with Rational Expectations | George W. Evans |
| 477 | 1985.11 | Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms | Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole |
| 478 | 1985.11 | A Sequential Theory of Bargaining | Ariel Rubinstein |
| 479 | 1985.9 | Durable Mechanisms for Bargaining with Private Information: Definition, Existence, and Characterization | Stephen J. Turnbull |
| 480 | 1985.1 | Interactions between Signaling and Repeated Play with Borrower Default | Carol L. Such |
| 481 | 1985.11 | Selection Criteria for Models with Nonuniqueness | George W. Evans |
| 482 | 1985.12 | Viable Allocations of Information in Financial Markets | Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer |
| 483 | 1986.2 | Walrasian Equilibrium without Survival: Existence, Efficiency and Remedial Policy | Jeffrey L. Coles, Peter J. Hammond |
| 484 | 1986.3 | Stable Standards of Behavior: A Unifying Approach to Solution Concepts | Joseph Greenberg |
| 485 | 1986.3 | Middlemen | Ariel Rubinstein, Asher Wolinsky |
| 486 | 1986.3 | A Simple Proof of the Equivalence Theorem for Oligopolistic Mixed Markets | Joseph Greenberg, Benyamin Shitovitz |
| 487 | 1986.5 | Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring | Dilip Abreu, David Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti |
| 488 | 1986.12 | Structural Consistency, Consistenxy and Sequential Rationality | David M. Kreps, Garey Ramey |
| 489 | 1986.6 | On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements | Drew Fudenberg, David M. Kreps, David K. Levine |
| 490 | 1986.8 | On Competitive Cycles in Productive Economies | Jess Benhabib, Guy Laroque |
| 491 | 1986.12 | Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly | Lawrence Ausubel, Raymond Deneckere |
| 492 | 1986.10 | Competition, Non-Linear Pricing and Rationing in Credit Markets | Mordecai Kurz |
| 493 | 1986.10 | Structure and Complexity: The Use of Recursion Theory in the Foundations of Neoclassical Mathematical Economics and the Theory of Games | Alain A. Lewis |
| 494 | 1986.11 | The Demand for Information and the Distribution of Income | Kenneth J. Arrow |
| 495 | 1986.11 | Perfect Equilibria Paths in Repeated Games: The Unique Maximal Stationaty Stable Standard of Behavior | Joseph Greenberg |
| 496 | 1986.11 | Strategic Incentive in Manipulation in Rivalrous Agency | Chaim Fershtman, Kenneth Judd |
| 497 | 1986.11 | Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome | Ariel Rubinstein, Asher Wolinsky |
| 498 | 1986.11 | An Extension of The Modigliani-Miller Theorem to Stochastic Economies with Incomplete Markets | Peter DeMarzo |
| 499 | 1986.12 | Information Transfer and Investment in Product Quality | Garey Ramey |
| 500 | 1986.12 | The Core of a Market with a Continuum of Players and Finite Coalitions; From Finite to Continuum Economies | Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders |
| 501 | 1986.12 | The Power of Small Coalitions in Large Economies | Peter J. Hammond |
| 502 | 1987.1 | Paths of Optimal Accumulation in Two-Sector Models | Michele Boldrin |
| 503 | 1987.2 | NTU Values of Large Games | Myrna Holtz Wooders, William R. Zame |
| 504 | 1987.2 | Product Quality Signaling and Market Performance | Garey Ramey |
| 505 | 1987.2 | The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata | Dilip Abreu, Ariel Rubinstein |
| 506 | 1987.3 | Deterrence in Oligopolistic Competition | Robert Wilson |
| 507 | 1987.3 | Lipschitz Continuous Policy Functions for Strongly Concave Optimization Problems | Luigi Montrucchio |
| 508 | 1987.3 | Coalitional Value | Mordecai Kurz |
| 509 | 1987.3 | An Alternate Approach to Axiomatizations of the Von Neumann/Morgenstern Characteristic Function | Alain A. Lewis, Raghu Sundaram |
| 510 | 1987.3 | Entry and Exit | Robert Wilson |
| 511 | 1987.4 | Equivalent Equilibria | Michihiro Kandori |
| 巻号 | 年月次 | タイトル | 著者 |
| 7 | 1991.5 | Nonergodic Economic Growth | Steven N. Durlauf |
| 8 | 1991.5 | Path Dependence in Aggregate Output | Steven N. Durlauf |
| 9 | 1991.5 | Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants | Jeroen Swinkels |
| 10 | 1991.5 | Stability and Evolutionary Stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg-Mertens | Jeroen Swinkels |
| 11 | 1991.5 | Monotone Comparative Statics | Paul Milgrom, Christina Shannon |
| 12 | 1991.6 | Increasing Returns, Quality Uncertainty, Product Differentiation, and Countercyclical Price Mark-Ups | Helmut Zink |
| 13 | 1991.6 | The Existence of Aggregate Capital When Returns to Scale are Non-Constant | Lawrence J. Lau |
| 14 | 1991.10 | Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games | Michihiro Kandori, George Mailath, Rafael Rob |
| 15 | 1991.10 | Returns to Scale, Information, and Economic Growth | Kenneth J. Arrow |
| 16 | 1991.10 | Economic Natural Selection and Adaptive Behavior | Lawrence Blume, David Easley |
| 17 | 1991.10 | Pecuniary Externalities and Multiple Equilibria: A Competitive Economy without an Insurance Market | Lars Ljundqvist |
| 18 | 1991.10 | Efficient Resource Allocation under Increasing Returns | Rajiv Vohra |
| 19 | 1991.10 | The Capital Market, the Wealth Distribution and the Employment Relation | Andrew F. Newman |
| 20 | 1991.10 | Scale Returns in Communication and Elite Control of Organizations | Kenneth J. Arrow |
| 21 | 1991.10 | Rational Frenzies and Crashes | Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer |
| 22 | 1991.10 | Nonnegative Stochastic Dynamic Preferences | Peter A. Streufert |
| 23 | 1991.10 | Existence and Characterization Results for Stochastic Dynamic Programming | Peter A. Streufert |
| 24 | 1991.10 | New Optimality Principles for Economic Efficiency and Equilibrium | David G. Luenberger |
| 25 | 1991.10 | Strong Convergence of Recursive M-Estimators for Models with Dynamic Latent Variables | Chung-Ming Kuan, Halbert White |
| 26 | 1991.10 | Recursive M-Estimation, Nonlinear Regression and Neural Network Learning with Dependent Observations | Chung-Ming Kuan, Halbert White |
| 27 | 1991.10 | On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior | Eddie Dekel, Suzanne Scotchmer |
| 28 | 1991.10 | Ex Ante versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion Rules | Michael Waldman |
| 29 | 1991.10 | Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts | Ching-to Albert Ma |
| 30 | 1991.10 | The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment | Margaret A. Meyer |
| 31 | 1991.10 | Global Environment and North-South Trade | Graciela Chichilnisky |
| 32 | 1991.10 | Rules for Changing the Rules | Spyros Vassilakis |
| 33 | 1991.10 | Functional Fixed Points | Spyros Vassilakis |
| 34 | 1991.10 | Increasing Returns in Infinite Horizon Economies | Christina Shannon |
| 35 | 1991.10 | Convergence of Recursive Learning Mechanisms to Steady States and Cycles in Stochastic Nonlinear Models | George W. Evans, Seppo Honkapohja |
| 36 | 1991.10 | Biased Contests and Moral Hazard: Implications for Career Profiles | Margaret A. Meyer |
| 37 | 1991.10 | Learning in an Equilibrium Search Model | James D. Dana, Jr. |
| 38 | 1991.10 | Designing a Private Industry: Government Actions with Endogenous Market Structure | James D. Dana, Jr., Kathryn E. Spier |
| 39 | 1991.11 | On the Structure and Diversity of Rational Beliefs | Mordecai Kurz |
| 40 | 1991.11 | On Rational Belief Equilibria | Mordecai Kurz |
